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A general target of human cognition is
to prevent or adapt to its own con-
flicts in information processing. Research
on this issue employs conflict paradigms
(e.g., Stroop task) in which salient task-
irrelevant features either help (congru-
ent trials) or hinder (incongruent tri-
als) task-relevant processing. An impor-
tant exercise within this domain is to
obtain a clear understanding of the con-
cept of conflict, and of the precise cir-
cumstances under which it arises and trig-
gers behavioral adaptations. Throughout
the last century various proposals have cir-
culated (see Botvinick et al., 2001), but
since Botvinick et al. (2001) proposed their
seminal conflict monitoring theory the field
has widely adopted “response conflict” as
the main trigger for cognitive adaptations.
Yet, in a recent paper, Desender et al.
(2014) provided great fuel for discussion.
Based on a simple but clever paradigm,
they claim that not response conflict per
se but rather consciously experienced con-
flict drives adaptation. Here we outline
why Desender and colleagues overesti-
mate the importance of their data in sup-
porting a crucial role for conflict aware-
ness, but underrate other aspects of their
study.
Conflict monitoring theory was the first
to offer a computational definition of cog-
nitive conflict. Specifically, it proposes that
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Carter and
van Veen, 2007) tracks the total amount
of energy at the response level: when mul-
tiple responses are simultaneously acti-
vated (response conflict), cognitive control
needs to be enhanced. Thereby, the conflict
monitoring theory formally disentangles
“what happens on the screen” from “what
happens in the brain.” Incongruent items
generate substantial activation across dif-
ferent response nodes in the brain, and it is
the subsequently generated conflict signal
that triggers adapted information process-
ing. Accordingly, congruency effects seem
to be reduced following incongruent trials
(i.e., Gratton effect; Gratton et al., 1992), a
modulation also observed in ACC activity
(Kerns et al., 2004).
By explicitly differentiating item
(in)congruency and conflict, conflict
monitoring theory opened up the pos-
sibility that—in principle—the two can be
functionally dissociated, as sources other
than item (in)congruency (see below)
can contribute to conflict (and thus to
adaptation) as well. Yet, although widely
assumed across computational cognitive
control models (Botvinick et al., 2001;
Verguts and Notebaert, 2008; Jiang et al.,
2014), Desender and colleagues are the
first to provide an empirical foundation
to this dissociation. In their study, par-
ticipants performed a masked priming
task in which barely visible primes could
either be congruent or incongruent with
the target. After each trial, participants
reported whether or not they experienced
conflict (irrespective of prime visibility).
The crucial finding was that this subjective
experience of conflict, but not item (in)
congruency per se, determined conflict
adaptation: the Gratton effect followed
subjective report when it deviated from
item (in) congruency. This indeed con-
firms that other sources than item (in)
congruency drove conflict levels in the
brain.
Interestingly, instead of fitting in with a
stronghold of models on conflict adapta-
tion, Desender et al. (2014) actually con-
cluded against these models. Specifically,
they claimed their data shows that “the
[conscious] experience of conflict, and not
response conflict per se, is the crucial fac-
tor underlying cognitive adaptation effects”
(Desender et al., 2014, abstract). We
feel that this conclusion—depicted in
Figure 1A—is unnecessary because their
data could equally well be captured
by current conflict adaptation models.
Specifically, models such as conflict moni-
toring theory allow quantifying the level of
conflict, and larger conflict signals result in
stronger conflict adaptation. At the same
time, from the assumption that conscious
experience is partially determined by sig-
nal strength (i.e., the stronger a signal, the
higher the likelihood that it reaches con-
sciousness; e.g., Cleeremans, 2008), larger
conflict signals should also lead to a higher
probability of subjective conflict experi-
ence. This indicates that larger conflict
signals in the brain can drive both larger
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FIGURE 1 | Desender et al. (2014) are the first to show that sources other
than item (in) congruency can contribute to conflict and subsequent
adaptation. Candidate sources may be responses biases (for example,
through expectancies or response repetition effects), noise, or
stimulus-response accidents such as when the letters “L” and “E” from a
Stroop color-word like BLUE partly activate the response YELLOW due to
letter sharing. Two scenarios may fit the data reported by Desender et al.
(2014). (A) The scenario sketched by Desender and colleagues themselves, in
which conscious conflict experience crucially modulates the link between
conflict processing and adaptation. (B) An alternative scenario, consistent
with current computational work on cognitive control, that construes
conscious conflict experience and adaptation as two independent
consequences of conflict processing in the brain. We believe that both
scenarios are consistent with the data. Future work is required to empirically
dissociate the two perspectives, and inspiration for this equally important as
challenging research endeavor may be found, for example, in studies on the
general role of expectancies in conflict adaptation (e.g., Duthoo and
Notebaert, 2012; Jiménez and Méndez, 2013) and/or more direct
measurements of conflict strength such as with electromyography
recordings (e.g., Burle et al., 2005).
conflict adaptation and subjective experi-
ence without the latter two being causally
related (Figure 1B). The study of Desender
and colleagues does not imply a crucial
role for conscious experience in conflict
adaptation, as the link between them is
purely correlational.
Why then did Desender and colleagues
conclude otherwise? We believe a crit-
ical issue may be the authors’ implicit
assumption that additional sources con-
tributing to conflict (like expectancies) can
only work at the level of consious con-
flict experience. Instead, we would argue
that expectancies (or any other type of
response bias, such as residual activa-
tion as in response repetition effects, sys-
tem noise, etc.), may equally well have a
direct impact at the level of conflict gen-
eration (as modeled by Botvinick et al.,
2001), before reaching conflict aware-
ness (Figure 1B). Specifically, an over-
all bias toward a specific response will
result in overall heightened activation at
the response level. Therefore, conflict can
occur even on congruent trials whenever
these require a different response than
the response that the system was biased
toward. As such, the conclusion that “sub-
jective experience did [sometimes] not coin-
cide with actual conflict” (Desender et al.,
2014; abstract) is not tenable, as due to
additional sources at play, there is no way
of measuring the actual conflict signal in
the design of Desender and colleagues. Yet,
this possibility—which would lead us to
the perspective depicted in Figure 1B—
was not considered by Desender and
colleagues. An important future challenge
will be to dissociate the two perspectives
empirically.
Overall, Desender and colleagues
demonstrate that multiple (simultane-
ous) sources can drive conflict generation
in the brain. Interestingly, various compu-
tational models (Botvinick et al., 2001;
Verguts and Notebaert, 2008) already
tried to account for this by implement-
ing noisy signals and residual activation
from previous trials. The paradigm of
Desender and colleagues probes future
exploration of the precise sources of
conflict besides item incongruency, and
offers promising opportunities to cogni-
tive neuroscientists interested in neural
correlates of conflict processing and adap-
tation. However, in light of recent efforts
to develop homunculus-free models of
cognitive control (Verguts and Notebaert,
2009; Egner, 2014; Verbruggen et al.,
2014), we want to remain extra cautious in
assigning a crucial role to conscious con-
flict experience as long as the data do not
directly necessitate this.
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